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An Analytical Discussion of the Promise of
Sale and Related Subjects, Including
Earnest Money
J Denson Smith*
To Pothier, whose views on the subject were followed in the
redaction of the Code Napoleon, a promise of sale was a unilateral contract. It was binding on the promisor, but imposed no
promise or obligation on the part of the promisee. He offered an
illustration as follows "For example, if in the contract of sale
that I make to you of my library there is this clause 'I obligate
myself also to sell to you the shelves if you wish to buy them.'
this clause constitutes a promise to sell you the shelves." And
he continued, "There is a big difference between the promise to
sell and the sale itself. He who promises to sell you a thing does
not then sell it, he merely contracts the obligation to sell when
you require him to do so.
The contract of sale is a bilateral
contract by which each of the parties obligates himself to the
other but the promise of sale is an agreement by which only he
who promises to sell obligates himself, he to whom the promise
is made does not contract any obligation."1 Planiol held the
same view. "Let us therefore consider the promise of sale as a
unilateral convention. There is no sale yet since there is no
buyer. There is a single obligation contracted by the owner who
alone is obligated in promising to sell." '2 And he gave a similar
illustration.8
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 3 OEUVB S DE POTHIER, TRAITiP DE CONTRAT DE VENTE nos 476, 478 (2d ed.
1861)

"476. Une promesse de vendre est une convention par laquelle quelqu'un

s'oblige envers un autre de luI vendre une chose.
"Par exemple, ss, dans le contrat de vente que ye vous at fait de ma bibliothque,
it y a cette clause, 'que )e m'oblige de vous vendre anss$ les tablettes, si elles vous
convsennent, at as
VOus voulez lea acheter', cette clause renferme une promessa de
vous vendre les tablettes.
"It V a une grande diffdrence entre la promasse de vendre et la vente mrme.
Ceus qus vous promet de vous vendre une chose, ne la vend pas encore, il contracte
seulement l'obligation de vous la vendre lorsque vous le requerrez."
"478. Le contrat de vente est un contrat synallagmatique, par lequel chacune
des parties s'oblige l'une envers l'autre, mats la pronesse de vendre est une convention par laquella it n'y a que celuu qus promet de vendre, qus s'engage, celu$ a
qus la promesse est faite ne contracte de sa part aucune obligation."
2. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOU

ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE no. 1401 (1959). See also 5 Aunia
CIVIL FRANCAIS 4-5, no. 349 (6th ed. 1946).
3. 2 PLANIOL, Op. cit. suipra note 2, at no. 1399.
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Perhaps no clearer statement of the legal nature of the "option" of our modern law could be made. The one to whom :the
option is given acquires a right to buy the thing covered by the
option without the assumption at the time of a corresponding
duty. The resulting contract is consequently unilateral. It seems
clear, therefore, that the promise of sale, as understood by
Pothier, amounted to what is now known by us as an option.
Indeed, modern French writers speak of the right given to: the
promisee of the promise of sale as an option.4 And just as an
exercise of the option produces a bilateral contract, so also, when
the buyer avails himself of the promise of sale, a bilateral contract results, as Pothier pointed out. In both cases the buyer
has a right that the seller shall deliver the property to him and
the seller is under a duty to do so; in addition, the seller has a
right that the buyer shall pay the price and the buyer is under a
duty to do so.
In Pothier's time some controversy existed over the question
of whether a promise of sale was specifically enforceable. This
stemmed from the further question of whether an order of specific enforcement would compel the promisor to do something
inasmuch as a decree of this kind was not favored because of
the necessary interference with one's personal liberty. By way of
answer, Pothier pointed out that no such interference Would
result from a decree of specific enforcement because in such a
case the personal action of the seller is not required, but his
obligation "may be sanctioned by a judgment ordering that, in
the absence of the debtor's willingness to execute the contract of
sale, the judgment will stand for the contract."6
The redactors of the Code Napoleon adopted Pothier's view
and expressed it in Article 1589 simply by providing that a
promise of sale amounts to a sale when there exists the reciprocal
consent of both parties on the thing and the price. That is, when
the option holder consents to take the property, there is a con4. Id. no. 1401: "In practice the promise of sale takes different names. The
name 'option' is given to the right of the creditor to declare within a certain delay
that he intends to realize the promise." 5 AUBRY ET RAU, Op. cit. supra note 2i
at no. 349: "La declaration de la volontM d'acheter, appeld4e couramment levde
roption peut etre implicite, et n'est soumise d aucune forme, sauf stipulation contraire."
5. 3 OEUVRES DE POTHIERa, op. cit. supra note 1, at no. 479.

6. Ibid.: "Mais le fait qui est l'objet d'une promesse de vendre, n'est pas un
fait extrieur et corporel de la personne du d6biteur; il pent le supplder par un
jugemen't, comme noUs l'avons rapportS, qui ordonnera que, faute par le ddbiteur
de vouloir passer un contrat de vente, le jugement vaudra pour contrat." See also
2 PLANiOL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1406.
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currence of consent and the promise- of sale is'converted into a
sale.. They had 'already provided in Article 1583 that the sale is
perfect -between the parties and the property is acquired of
right-by the buyer with regard to .the seller,- from the time there
is agreement on the thing and the price, although the thing has
not yet been delivered nor the price paid. :Consequently, and in
harmony with this principle, under the law of France, when a
promise of sale-is taken up by the buyer's giving his consent to
buy, the sale is perfected and ownership passes to the buyer. As
the owner he is entitled to a judgment of possession. If delivery
of ,thething and payment of the price are to be performed concurrently he must pay or tender payment of the price; but this
bears only on his right to possession not his ownership of the
thing. So that by providing in Article 1589 that the promise of
sale! amounts to a sale after the buyer gives his consent to buy,
7
specific enforcement was sanctioned.
It is to: be observed that Article 1589 does not undertake to
define a promise of sale. It simply recognizes that, when the
consent of the buyer to buy is joined to the seller's consent to
sell, a sale results. Until the consent of the buyer is -given, the
agreement is simply a promise of sale, or, in more familiar terms,
a,unilateral option contract. Unfortunately, confusion has resuited over the true nature of the promise of sale apparently
because it was considered necessary, in *order to overcome any
doubt as to whether a promise of sale was specifically enforceable,. to provide in Article 1589 that a sale results when the buyer
gives:his consent to buy.8
7. See 2 PLANIOL, op. eit* supra note 2, at no. 1406: "The Code has further
simplified the situation: 'The promise of sale is equivalent to sale,' says Article
1589. Therefore, it'is the promise itself, as soon as the consent of the buyer is
joined to it, .which constitutes the contract of sale .... If the promisor refuses to
deliver the, thing it is necessary, as in the time of Pothier, to resort to the courts
to obtain a judgment; ,but the judge no longer need condemn the vendor to execute
a contract as formerly; the court simply finds the existence of the promise of sale
and the consent of the buyer, and orders that he be sent into possession."
Of course, since a matter of public order is not here involved, the parties could
agree to the contrary, as the French clearly recognize, but in the absence of such
a contrary agreement the principle applies.
'8 See 2 PLANIOL, loc.,cit. supra note 2; 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET DE LA MORANDIEE, 'TAITA
DE DRorT CIWL nos. 831, 832, 834, 843 (10th ed. 1953): "834.
Promesse synallagmatique de vendre et d'acheter.- Un propridtaire promet de
vendre son bien moyennant un prix ddtermind, et celui d qui it fait cette promesso
s'ongage de son c6td d l'acheter au prix fiTd. D'aprs l'article 1589, cette double
promese vaut vente. En effet, chacun des contractantss'est obligd, l'un t vendre,
l'autre 4 aoheter. II y a done engagement rdciproque, c'est-a-dire contrat synallagmatique.
..
: "Mais quel eat, au juste, lesens de cette formule quae a promesse de vente vaut
vents? Deu

opinions ont dWd soutenues sur ce point:

"A.-YD'aprs le premiers commentateurs du Code Civil, 'article 1589 sig-
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But if the promise of sale of French civilian law is simply the
common law option, the legal requisites of the two are not the
same. This results from the difference between- cause and consideration.9 The common law option is easily distinguished from
a: simple offer because it is supported by consideration and the
simple offer is not. Since this distinction is not possible under
the French theory of cause, it is necessary to determine whether
there is any difference between a simple offer and a'promise:of
sale under that system.
... In France an offeror can render a simple offer irrevocable
simply by an expression of will to that effect or by making the
offer under circumstances which give rise to the inference that
he intends to allow the offeree a period of time within which to
accept the offer. He has the legal capacity to so bind himself
if he sees fit to do so without seeking or receiving anything in
return. As Loisel put it, "On lie les boeufs par les comes et les
hommes par les paroles." The standard discussion of this problem in -the writings of the French centers merely -around -the
proper explanation of the principle, not its existence. Three
views have been offered. One is that the offeror .is bound on. a
delictual basis if he revokes.his offer without giving the offeree
the. benef it of the time allowed for acceptance. Another is that
the offeror becomes bound by a preliminary contract stemming
from a presumption of willingness of the offeree to avail himself
of the opportunity to consider the offer within the time allowed.
The third and more realistic is that the offeror binds himself by
the sole effect of his will. 10 But whatever view is taken, the
nifierait seulement que la promesse de vente, bien que contenant un obligation de
faire, est susceptible d'exacution forcee ...
"B.-La vdritM, c'est que le transfert de propridti s'effectue ds le moment de la
double promesse. Le ldgislateur a voulu que ces formules; je promets de vendre,

je promets d'acheter, soient synonymes de je vends, j'ach6te. Des lots que cet
accord eziste, la vente est conclue, sans qu'il faille attacher d'importance auz
nuances, peut-6tre irrdfldchies, du langage employd par lea contractants (Chamb6ry,

31 janvier 1894, D.P. 95.2.347, S.96.2.102; Paris, 15 juillet 1931, D.H.1931,498).
"Si tel est le sons de la loi, il eat clair qu'ici encore elle ne fait qu'interprdter
La volontd probable des parties. Une intention contraire certain devrait 6tre respectMe (Req. 26 juin 1935, D.H.1935.414). Cette volont de reculer dons l'avenir la
rdalisation de la promesse de vente rdsulterait-elle de la simple apposition d'un
terme? On l'a soutenu. Mais la Jurisprudence s'est prononee en sens contraire
(Req. 26 mars 1884, D.P.84.1.403, S.86.1.341; 20 janvier 1941, D.A.1941.179). En
effet, si La promesse synallagmatique de vente vaut vente, la promesse de vente A
terme vaut vente d terme. Or, dans la vente d terme, la formation du contrat et le
trmwfert do propridtd ne sont pas diffdrds. Ce qui est renvoyd 4 'echdance du
terme, c'est la tradition de la chose ou le versement du prix."
9. See, generally, Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REV
Ew32 (1951).
" 10.
TOULLIEB, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIS no. 30 (1846), 2
CoLIN ET CAPI-
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offeror is not privileged to revoke his offer during the time allowed for its acceptance. Yet it does not follow from this that
the simple offer is a promise of sale, or unilateral contract.
In the illustration given by Pothier, the lessor's promise of
sale is given in return for the lessee's consent to lease the
premises, which fact would, indeed, satisfy the requirement of
common law consideration, but no such legal support is needed
to render it effective. The contract known as a promise of sale
can be created in French civilian law although nothing may be
given by the promisee to the promisor that would constitute
consideration in the common law sense. The promisor simply has
the legal capacity to enter into a unilateral contract with the
buyer by offering the latter a period of time for deliberation,
and by receiving in return his consent to avail himself of the
opportunity. If this happens, a contract results because, in
French law, a concurrence of wills, other factors being present,
will produce a contract. And herein lies the difference between a
simple pollicitation and a promise of sale: the latter is based on
a concurrence of consent which is not present in the former. The
seller's willingness to extend the option to the buyer may rest on
something given to the seller in return, as, for example, taking a
lease, or, for that matter, making a present payment, or it may
rest on his will alone. Even if the cause of the granting of the
option lies merely in a spirit of generosity, it is nevertheless
valid. The resulting contract is binding without satisfying the
requirement of the authentic act because, since there is no depletion of the patrimony of the promisor, he is not donating. But
since the promise of sale, or option, is itself a contract, the death
of the promisor will not terminate it, speaking generally, any
more than the death of any contracting party will terminate his
obligations. A simple pollicitation, on the contrary, even though
irrevocable by the offeror, will terminate with his death or supervening incapacity.
* A clear expression of the foregoing will be found in Aubry
& Rau's treatise on the French civil law. It is there said, "A
promise to sell, not yet accepted, forms only a simple pollicitation. ... But a promise to sell may be accepted without a reciprocal engagement by the buyer and becomes by such acceptance
obligatory on the promisor. It is called a unilateral promise of
sale .... The benefit of the promise is susceptible of being assigned unless there is a contrary stipulation. The promise is
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transmissible in case of death, actively and passively."11 On the
other hand, in speaking of a simple offer, the authors say: "As
far as the acceptance of it is concerned, it may, in general, be
given as long as the offer has not been validly withdrawn. This
rule is subject to an important exception when the offerer has
fixed a delay for its acceptance, in which case he will be released
from it only when his offer has not been accepted within the
delay fixed. On the other hand, the acceptance may not take place
effectively after the death of the offerer or when he has lost, in
12
fact or in law, the necessary capacity to persevere in his will.'
Additional doubt has arisen in French civilian law concerning
the legal consequence of the subjection of one of the promises
in a bilateral contract to a purely potestative condition or condition the occurrence of which depends on the will of the promisor.
For example, if A, with a view to inducing B to give his consent
to buy in return, promises to sell his farm to B, and B promises
to buy it if he wishes, the latter's promise is subject to a purely
potestative condition in that performance of the promise to buy
rests on his will alone. The result of this is that since A's
promise is offered only in return for B's promise, and B does not
in fact promise anything, A's will is vitiated and he is himself
not bound. 13 The common law would explain that there is no
consideration to support A's promise because the promise given
to him in return is wholly illusory and that a promise unsupported by consideration is not binding.' 4 But since the requirement of consideration is not present in French civilian law, no
such easy distinction is possible. In the latter system the difference lies in the fact that, a bilateral contract being contemplated, the legal foundation for A's promise rests in his receiving
a return promise from B, which constitutes a condition of the
binding effect of the former. This is true because, basically, in
the example given, the cause or motive of A's promising to sell
TANT,

DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS

no. 28 (8th ed. 1935) ; 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra

note 2, at no. 981.
11. 5 AuBRY ET RAU, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7, no. 349. Planiol (op. cit. supra
note 2, at no. 1401) makes an equally clear analysis: "This promise is not a simple
offer. . . . It constitutes a definitive engagement since it has been accepted by the
other party. It is therefore a special contract which has its own nature and effects
and which bears the name 'the promise of sale.' It is not yet a sale but the sale
will perhaps one day be completed by the adherence of the buyer, if he desires."
12. 4 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIs no. 343 (1946).
13. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1170, 1174; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2024, 2034, 2035
(1870). This principle is discussed in Smith, The Principle of Mutuality of Obli.
-gation and. its Juridical Utility in Enforcing Contractual Fair Dealing, which appears in FESTSCHRIFT YUR ERNST RABEnL 279 (1953).
14. 1 CoRnIN, CONTRACTs § 157 (1950).
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is to get B's present promise to buy in return and, since he does
not, his. own promise rests on a false cause and is unenforceable. 15 It is to be observed that this discussion deals with an
offer for a present bilateral contract Where the legal support for
each promise is found in the other. However, as already observed, a promise of sale historically speaking is a unilateral
contract the binding effect of which is not made to rest on the
promisor's receiving at the time a return promise to buy. The
buyer's right of property in the thing the seller promises to sell
is, of course, conditioned on his consenting to buy, but this consent is not required to render binding the promise of sale itself
for the simple reason that the promisor does not so intend. He
gives, his promise to allow time to the promisee not in return
for a present commitment to buy but because it is simply his
will to do so whatever his purpose may be. In consequence, it
cannot be said that, because he does not get a present promise to
buy, his will is vitiated and the cause of his promise is false.
Perhaps the difference of opinion encountered among the
French writers themselves over the question of whether where
promises are exchanged and one of them is subject to a purely
potestative condition the other may yet subsist, stems from an
inadequate analysis of the cause of the undertaking in question,
or, put another way, the failure to distinguish between a bilateral
contract where each promise is made to rest on a return promise
and a unilateral contract where no return promise or undertaking is sought. 16 Certain it is that, under a system where only
an exchange of consent is necessary to create a contractual obligation, the nature of the contract is controlled by its cause. In
any event, the legal significance of the potestative condition relates to bilateral contracts, not unilateral like the promise of sale.
It seems clear, however, that the foregoing does not represent
an accurate appraisal of the law of Louisiana. The promise of
sale, irrevocable simple offers, contracts to sell, and sales have
proved to be troublesome concepts. The redactors of our Civil
Code of 1825 included verbatim the language of Article 1589 of
the Code Napoleon but added a provision making it clear that the
required elements of a sale must be included in the promise of
sale, and that the formal requirements of Article 2440 of our
code must also be satisfied. 7 However, in 1910 the article was
15' See. Smith, Supra note 9, at 30-31.
16. See. Brown, Pote8tative Conditions and Illusory Promises, 5 TUL. L. REv.
396, 401-02 (1931), and authorities there cited.
17. These additions may have been designed to take care of certain difficulties
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amended so as to read in part that when there-is reciprocal consent the promise of sale "so far amounts to a sale as .to give
either party the right to enforce specific performance of same."
This portion of the amendment did not, it will be observed, touch
the legal nature of a promise of sale, but simply: dealt with the
legal consequences which would follow the. giving by the buyer of
his consent to buy. Whereas under the French version the sale
would be perfected and the property in the thing would be acquired by the purchaser's giving his consent,18 our amendment
changed this consequence in a negative way by limiting the effect
of acceptance to the acquisition of a right to specific performance. Therefore with us the result is a bilateral contract to sell,
but not a sale, since the latter involves a transfer of ownership.
In addition, however, a second paragraph was added to the
article, reading, as amended in 1920: "One may purchase the
right, or option-to accept or reject, within a stipulated time, an
offer or promise to sell, after the purchase of such option, for
any consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or promise can
not be withdrawn before the time agreed upon; and should it be
accepted within the time stipulated, the contract or agreement to
sell,. evidenced by such promise and acceptance, may be specifically enforced by either party."
Although this portion of the article, as amended, does not
explicitly say that an irrevocable promise of sale cannot be made
without anything of value or any consideration being given for it
by way of purchase, nevertheless it carries that implication. In
consequence, a fair inference seems to arise that unless a promise
of sale has been purchased for some consideration it will not
become irrevocable. This, obviously, is contrary to the source of
our law.
1 The amendment may have been designed to bring the Code
into harmony with the understanding of the existing law by the
profession. The case law had been treating a promise by a seller
to sell coupled with a promise by a buyer to buy as a promise
of sale. We seem to have backed into this position as a result of
discussed by Pothier. See 3 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at nos. 481483, and 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. aupra note 2, at no. 1407.
18. 2 CoLIN, CAI'ITANT ET DE LA MORANDIERE, Op. cit. aupra note 8, at no. 832:
"Promesse unilatdrale de vendre ou d'acheter.-II y a prome8ae unilatdrale de vente
loraqu'un proprigtaire s'oblige d vendre un bien moyennant un prix ddtermin6 a
une peraonne, au cas o4 celle-ci voudrait l'acqudrir....

"(B) Plus exacte eat l'opinion que place la conclusion de la vente au moment
o4 le preneur, ddclare se prdvaloir de la promease a lui jaite (ddclare lever l'option
consentie en sa faveur, selon une expression souvent usitde en pratique.)"
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adopting the view that a bilateral agreement to sell and to buy,
where a formal act of sale is to be executed at a later date, does
not constitute a Sale, but merely gives rise to an action of specific
performance.1 9 In consequence, the agreement, under the influence of Article 2462, was called a promise of sale. This usage
may have been encouraged by the fact that Article 2462 as
originally worded invited misconstruction. It spoke of reciprocal
consent; hence it was easy to conclude that a promise of sale
involves reciprocal consent; yet it actually provided merely that
consents
when there is reciprocal consent, that is, after the buyer
20
sale.
a
into
converted
is
sale
of
promise
the
to buy,
Whatever the reason or reasons why we came to consider a
promise of sale as bilateral, by doing so we seem to have been
driven to the conclusion that our law, prior to the 1910 amend-

ment to Article 2462, did not recognize unilateral option contracts. This appears to have been the reason why a new para21
graph was added to the article to deal with such contracts.
Considering the fact that the illustration given by Pothier, whose
19. This view seems to have been dictated by what were counted as policy considerations. See Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855) ; McDonald v. Aubert,
17 La. 448 (1841). See also Comments, The Effect of Article 2462 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 629 (1941), and Perfection of Public Sales,
17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 197 (1956).
Ownership cannot be described except in terms of the legal relations between
the "owner" and other persons. Hence a transfer of ownership is purely a legal
effect attached to the manifestations of the parties. It may take place at a time
provided by the law or the parties may be given the power of selecting the time.
11 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no. 19 (2d ed. 1934). Louisiana
has not been too generous in giving recognition to the power of the parties to
exercise such control presumably, again, for reasons of policy. See Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908). But see
American Creosote Works v. Boland Machine and Mfg. Co., 213 La. 834, 35 So.2d
749 (1948). In theory, delivery of an act of sale is no more necessary to a vesting
in the buyer of the attributes of ownership, as between the parties, than is actual
or constructive delivery of a movable.
20. 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET DE LA MORANDIERE, Op. Cit. supra note 8, at no. 831:

"La promesse de vente n'est pas encore une vente. C'est un avant-contrat, pa.
lequel le crdancier obtient le droit d'acqudrir la chose quand it le jugera bon. Cependant, l'article 1589 semble assimiler les deux opdrations, car it dit: 'La promesse
de vente vaut vente lorsqu'il y a consentement rdciproque des deux parties sur la
chose et sur la pri-r.' En rdalitg, eetexte vise non pas la promesse de vente proprement dite, ou promesse unilatgrale,mais la promesse synallagmatique de vendre et
d'acheter qui elle, e8t bien un vente. ..."
Of course, it would not be inaccurate to refer to a promise of sale as a contract
to sell since it produces a conditional right-duty relationship. This is what we
call an "option." The term "contract to sell" is ordinarily applied to a bilateral
contract to sell and to buy which does not result in a "sale," or transfer of ownership. The use of the term "contract to sell" as contradistinguished from a "sale"
is not encountered in the writings of the French presumably for the reason that
ordinarily an agreement to buy and to sell results in a transfer of ownership, or
sale, as shown in the first paragraph of this note wherein the authors use the expression "promesse synallagmatique de vendre et d'acheter."
21. See Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930).
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views were so influential in the redaction of the French Civil
Code, would constitute an ordinary common law option, supported by consideration, and at the same time would be perfectly2
sound French civilian law, this was a strange development.
But it occurred, and in the process, the requirement that the
option be purchased "for any consideration therein stated" was
also incorporated. This could have been designed to change the
Civil Code, or to adopt what was deemed to be the case law, or
it might have resulted simply from an inadequate apprecation
of the theory of cause and its recognition of the binding efficacy
of the will. In any event, by virtue of the prior jurisprudence
and the amendment we have parted company with the traditional
French civilian theory in two respects: (1) a promise of sale
does not ripen into a sale upon a concurrence of thing, price, and
consent, but merely gives rise to a binding contract to sell on the
date agreed for the confection of an act of sale; and (2) a unilateral contract giving rise to an option to purchase now requires
consideration. 23
At the same time, our law relating to simple offers has been
immersed in doubt. Article 1809 of the Louisiana Civil Code
recognizes that a simple offer may be made with a period of
irrevocability. Accordingly, if an offer contains an expression of
willingness to give the offeree a time for acceptance, or the circumstances of the case give rise to a presumption that such is the
offeror's intention, the offer will be irrevocable although it will
terminate with the offeror's death. 24 This is, of course, unadulterated French civilian law. But our jurisprudence has been
25
reluctant to give Article 1809 its historical meaning and effect.
Perhaps the influence of the common law doctrine of consideration has been too pervasive and persuasive for the bar, the
22. In a broader sense our law has always recognized the power of contracting
parties having the requisite legal capacity to bind themselves in any way they see
fit as long as they do not offend against any prohibitory law or public order and
good morals. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1764 (1870). Inasmuch as there has never been
anything in the Code to prohibit an option it would seem to follow that such a
contract has always been possible in Louisiana. The Code Napoleon does not
expressly provide for the promise of sale, yet it has been recognized as a valid
unilateral contract since a time long prior to the adoption of the code. It is referred to in Arts. 1589 and 1590 for more particular purposes. The provisions of
our Code were the same prior to 1910. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2462, 2463 (1870).
23. Glover v. Abney, 160 La. 175, 106 So. 735 (1926).
24. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1809, 1810 (1870).
25. See Miller v. Douville, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893)
Blanks v.
Sutcliffe, 122 La. 448, 47 So. 765 (1908) ; Vermilion Sugar Co. v. Valee, 134 La.
661, .64 So. 670 (19i4) ; Miller v. Oden, 149 La. 771, 90 So. 167 (1929) ; Glover
v. Abney, 160 La. 175, 106 So. 735 (1926) ; Albert, v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co.,
Inc., 176 F. 2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949). 7f. Ever-tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83
So.2d 449 (La. App. 1955).
.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
XX
[

bench, and the legislature' as well. As has been noticed, the
amendment to Article 2462 gives support to this policy at least
as far as offers. to sell are concerned. And its language will not
permit the conclusion that it was designed merely to provide for
an irrevocable offer, or option, that would survive the death of
the offeror. It provides in substance that when an offer to sell
is supported by consideration "it cannot be withdrawn before
the time agreed upon," which means that the proposer may not
withdraw it. Yet under the circumstances stated in Article 1809
even a simple offer that will expire with the death of the offeror
may not be withdrawn. Consequently, it is not believed-that the
amendment Was born of the limited purpose to provide for a
proposal that would survive the death of the proposer. In any
event, it does make it clear that an option must be supported
by consideration not only to survive the death of the promisor
but also to terminate his power of withdrawal. 26 And from this
it appears clearly to follow that offers to sell have been withdrawn from the coverage of Article 1809 and may be revoked
notwithstanding that article unless supported by consideration.
This being true, our law is now the same in this respect as the
common law.
To sum up these matters in terms of the legal relations, under
the French solutions the following analysis would be descriptive.
The promise of sale gives rise to a conditional duty in the
promisor to deliver the property subject to the buyer's subsequently consenting to buy it, although the promisor continues to
possess the power, but not the privilege, to make a valid sale to
another. 27 The buyer has a conditional right to the delivery, the
condition being that he give his consent to buy, and a right that
the seller shall not sell to another although he does not enjoy an
immunity against a resale of the property by the promisor in
the meantime. He has also the legal power to convert the promise
of sale into a sale by giving his consent to buy. At this stage
26. It seems clear that the "consideration" required by this provision means
consideration in the common law sense of something given in exchange for the
promise in a bargaining transaction and not "cause" in the French civilian sense
of "motive." See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1896 "(1870), and cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932). The phrase, "for any consideration therein stipulated," was
substituted by the 1920 amendment for the phrase, "for value," which was used in
the 1910 amendment.
27. It appears that French law does not provide for the recordation of the
promise of sale. itself so as to protect the promisee against a sale to another.
Effective recordation is possible only after the buyer consents to buy. 2 COLIN,
CAPfTANT ET DR LA MORANDIERE, op. cit supro note 8, at no 832, p. 555, and cases
there cited. This is because the unilateral promise of sale does not create a real
right, or right of ownership.
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there is no reciprocal right in the seller that the buyer shall buy
nor -corresponding duty in the buyer because the contract is
unilateral. When the buyer exercises his power the promise of
sale ripens into a sale and ownership passes by operation of law.
The'seller's duty. to deliver becomes unconditional as likewise
becomes the buyer's right to possession of the thing in which • he
now has a real right. The buyer comes under a duty to receive
the delivery and to pay the price and the seller has a corresponding right. The resulting contract is therefore bilateral. These
consequences follow where the parties have not agreed differently
with respect to the vesting of ownership which power they
enjoy.
With us, when an option to buy an immovable is purchased
"for any consideration therein stipulated" the relations are the
same as those just described for the promise of sale of the French
law except that, by recording the option, an effective sale to a
third party can be precluded. However, when an option is taken
up in Louisiana ownership does not then pass but its transfer is
deferred until the delivery of the act of sale. The seller is under
a duty to make such delivery, at which time ownership will vest
in the buyer, and the buyer is under a duty to take and pay. In
short, the exercise of an option converts a unilateral promise of
sale into a bilateral contract to sell but not into a sale as in
France.
Although the unilateral promise of sale may be created in
France without any consideration bargained for and received
by the promisor in return for his agreement to give the buyer a
period of time for acceptance, the same is not true under our
law. By the same token, if a simple offer to sell is made and
the offeror states that it will remain open for a period of time,
it is, presumably, nevertheless subject to withdrawal. Consequently, whereas in France the offeror would not be privileged
to revoke the offeree's power of acceptance, he would have such
a privilege here.
The legal relations arising from a common law option are the
same as those created by the promise of sale of French civilian
law. The only difference rests in the requirement of consideration to support the former. If the option is exercised, according
to the rule followed at common law in the majority of jurisdictions, legal title remains in the vendor, but the purchaser acquires an equitable title which results in a shifting of the risk to
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him. 28 In Louisiana title or ownership is in the vendor and the
risk remains with him. In France ownership and risk are in the
purchaser.
The impact of the theory of earnest money in this area has
been beset with similar difficulties. This is due in part to the
fact that the concept of earnest money is related in the French
Code and that of Louisiana to the promise of sale. Article 1590
of the former, which is followed in Article 2463 of the Louisiana Code, provides that "if the promise of sale has been made
with earnest money, each of the contracting parties has control over his own withdrawal; he who has given the earnest
money by losing it, and he who has received it, by returning the
double."
At first blush the giving of earnest money in connection with
a unilateral option contract seems somewhat puzzling. However,
a closer examination of the problem reveals some support for the
code provisions. As has been noticed, under Article 1583 of the
Code Napoleon an agreement for the sale of a particular thing at
a fixed price has the effect of transferring ownership from the
seller to the buyer and is, therefore, a sale. Article 1589 is entirely consistent with this principle in providing that when the
promisee of a promise of sale gives his consent to buy, thus producing a concurrence of thing, price, and consent, a sale occurs.
Now, according to Pothier, a deposit of earnest money, intended
as a forfeit, accompanies a projected sale rather than a present
one.29 That is, a buyer who puts up earnest money does not then
consent to take the thing, but simply agrees to forfeit the deposit
if he decides not to take it. Consequently, the transaction is not
to be counted as a sale for lack of consent to buy by the purchaser
and, therefore, remains simply a promise of sale. To illustrate,
such an agreement might be framed by the seller's proposing to
the purchaser, "I will sell my farm to you and will give you fifteen days in which to make up your mind. However, you must
put up $100.00 with the understanding that if you decide not to
buy, I may keep the sum deposited. On the other hand, I may
withdraw my promise, but if I decide to do so I will return to you
double the amount put up." This is a proposed promise of sale
accompanied by the giving of earnest. When the buyer puts up
28. Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801). Of. Appleton
Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N.W. 505 (1930). See generally Vanneman, Risk of Loss in Equity Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate
and Transfer of Title, 8 MINN. L. Rxv. 127 (1924).
29. 3 OEUvREs DE POTHIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at nos 496-500.
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the money the result is a unilateral contract. The seller has assumed a duty, although he has the power to terminate it, whereas the buyer has not obligated himself. From a practical point of
view one of the parties may be no more bound to sell than the
other to buy; nevertheless, as the agreement is framed, the analysis is accurate. If the seller foregoes his power of withdrawal
and the purchaser elects to buy, then under the French Code a
bilateral contract results and the buyer acquires ownership although the thing has not yet been delivered or the price paid.
The giving of earnest money may properly be related, therefore, to the promise of sale. However, to do so exclusively is unjustifiable. It may be given as well in connection with a bilateral
contract. To illustrate, a seller may agree to sell and a buyer to
buy in connection with which the latter may put up earnest
money as a forfeit subject to the understanding that he may elect
not to perform his obligation to buy but to forfeit the earnest
money instead and the seller may likewise elect not to perform
his obligation to sell by forfeiting a like sum, which means returning the double. In such event, each party assumes an obligation in form although each reserves a power of withdrawal. Because mutual obligations are assumed, the power of withdrawal
given to each party is resolutory in nature; an exercise of it will
resolve or terminate the existing obligations. If the power of
withdrawal is not exercised, the promises will remain fully effective and no further agreement is necessary. It seems entirely
proper to say that each party is under an obligation, notwithstanding that he may have the choice between performing or forfeiting the amount of the deposit. A person may be counted properly as under an obligation to render a performance to another
although in the final analysis he may have the choice between
performing or paying damages for nonperformance. This is indeed the choice every contracting party has if his obligation is
not specifically enforceable. A seller returning the double of
earnest money deposited by the buyer is exercising such a choice,
and the buyer is in the same position although he has already put
up the forfeit.
A buyer who deposits earnest money under a promise of sale
is then simply in a position where he will lose the earnest money
if he does not take up his option within the time allowed, in which
event the seller simply retains it. But where earnest money is
put up in connection with a bilateral contract to sell, the seller
cannot of his own motion declare a forfeiture of the earnest
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money and proceed as if no obligation to sell had been entered
into. On the contrary, since the resolution of contracts must be
sued for, he must sue to have the contract resolved and the
0
earnest money declared forfeited to himA
The difference between the two foregoing cases is believed to
account for the discussion found in certain French writings concerning whether a deposit of earnest money operates to suspend
the sale under a bilateral agreement, or whether ownership passes but will be resolved in the event of an election to forfeit the
deposit.31 This question cannot arise when earnest money is deposited in connection with a promise of sale, or option, because
there can be no sale, that is, no transfer of ownership, until the
buyer gives his consent to buy, and when he does so he is electing
not to forfeit. But because a sale results when two parties in
France exchange their consent to sell and to buy a certain thing
at a fixed price, the question of whether this consequence will
follow if earnest money has been deposited under such an agreement must be resolved.
The reason of the matter supports the view that by putting
up earnest money it should be taken as the intention of the parties that ownership is not to pass until the election is made. Forfeit money in such a case is given to secure the privilege of withdrawing and as long as it is doubtful whether performance will
be rendered, it seems incontestably better to say that the transfer
of ownership is suspended. It is to be observed that although a
withdrawal will here operate as a resolutory condition to the existence of the contract consisting of the mutual promises, the
election by both parties to perform operates as a suspensive condition to the transfer of ownership thereunder, or the perfected
sale. Put another way, viewed contractually, the condition is
resolutory, but from the standpoint of the transfer of property
in the thing, it is suspensive. In other words, that which is suspended is a right of property and the enforceability of the duty
to deliver and the duty to pay.
Adverting to the deposit of earnest money in connection with
a-promise of sale, since the buyer does not then consent to buy,
and will forfeit the deposit if he elects not to do so, the deposit
begins to look very much like a payment made for an option. As
30. Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761, 767 -(1917) (on rehearing) ; Searcy v. Gulf Motor Co., 37 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1948).
'31. 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET DE LA MORANDIERE, Op. cit. supra note 8, at n ° 838;
11 BEUDANT, COUBS DE DHOIT'CIVIL no '327 (1934).
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in the case of a deposit of earnest money, if the purchaser of the
option decides not to take it up, he simply loses what he paid for
it. It does not follow from this, however, that the purchase price
of an option should be counted as earnest money. The basic reason for this is that the sum paid for an option is not put up as a
forfeit but as the whole price of the option, that is, the right
which the purchaser acquires to buy the property. This right is
the "thing" for which he pays. He is buying a right and if he
chooses not to use it that is his affair. Even if it should be agreed
that, if he elects to use it, the amount paid for it will be applied
to the purchase price, its character is not changed. The right he
acquires can be sold like any credit. It would be wholly unsound
to say that one to whom an option is assigned, for example, would
acquire merely the right to a return of what was paid for it by
the assignor. Such an assignment might be made for a price well
in advance of what was paid for it, which in fact, frequently
happens. If the price paid for an option is to be counted as earnest money, the option giver will also have the power to withdraw
so that the purchaser will not get what he is paying for, namely,
the right to purchase the property. This is the true difference
between the purchase of an option and the deposit of earnest
money in connection with a unilateral promise of sale. In the
final analysis it is simply a matter of intention. A payment made
for an option is not designed to afford a mutual power of withdrawal. And this suggests that the adoption of any mechanical
rule in this area would be undesirable.
The obvious way to avoid this difficulty is to recognize that
a buyer may put up forfeit money at the time he is granted an
option if that is his intention, but that if it appears he is simply
paying for an option as he might pay for any object of his desire,
a finding that the payment constitutes earnest or forfeit money
would be precluded. Presumably this situation would be dealt
with in this fashion in France where the intention of the parties
is controlling and a deposit is counted as forfeit money only when
there is no contrary manifestation. The presumption is overcome when the deposit is made as part payment of the purchase
price or is put up to bind the sale.3 2 And, of course, the result
32. It is believed that this view is uniformly held by the French despite some
expressions seemingly to the contrary. See Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So.

478 (1906). This case -seems to have constituted the principal authority for the
express overruling of Provenzano v. Claesser, 122 La. 378, 47 So. 688 (1908.),
where a payment. "on account of purchase price" was flatly held not to constitute
a deposit of earnest money, by the case. of Maloney v.. Aschaffenburg, 143 La.. 509,
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in France would be the same if, when the promisee in a promise
of sale takes up his option, he then makes a part payment on the
purchase price.
But the problem in Louisiana is not so simple. We have not
related the giving of earnest money to a unilateral promise of
sale in the sense of an option. We have applied it to bilateral
agreements. Some cases in our jurisprudence that treated the
question of earnest money as involving a finding of intention
have now been disapproved. By a line of authority which has
been consistent for some time any payment made in connection
with a contract to sell an immovable is considered forfeit money
unless a contrary intention is manifested. 33 As the rule is stated
it is applicable only when the deposit is made in connection with
a contract to sell. Since our jurisprudence has assimilated the
unilateral promise of sale to a bilateral contract to sell the rule
may be said to apply to a promise of sale, but only in the sense
of a bilateral exchange of promises. However, if with us a promise of sale is bilateral in nature, we are left with no statement
of the applicability of the theory of earnest money to options.
Consequently we remain free to say that that which a prospective
buyer pays for an option is not earnest or forfeit money as sug34
gested hereinabove. And there is authority for this view.
78 So. 761 (1917).
An examination of 3 MOURLON, EXAMEN DU CODE NAPOLEON
489 (1856)
and 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL (1877), cited in Capo v. Bugdahl,
indicates that both of these authors would have applied the presumption of earnest
money only where the agreement was silent with respect to what the parties intended. For example, "Les parties sont, sans doute, libre de manifester une volontd
contraire; celle que s'oppose d ce que la promesse soit retir6 est admise d prover
que les arrhes ont dtd dondes comme denier d Dieu ou comme d-compte . . ." 3
MOURLON, op cit. supra. In Capo v. Bugdahl there was no mention that the deposit was made as part payment of the purchase price or to bind the sale, which
fact would lend some support to the application of the presumption, and it is
interesting to note that the organ of the court in that case also wrote the opinion
in Provensano v. Glaesser, supra which held that a part payment of the purchase
price was not forfeit money. In both Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902
(1907), and Legier v. Braughan, 123 La. 46.3, 49 So. 22 (1909), there was an
express statement, in the former, that the deposit was put up to bind the sale, and
in the latter, as part payment of the purchase price. This would distinguish each
of these cases from Capo v. Bugdahl.
A recent expression of the point of view here stated appears in 3 DE LA MORANDIERE, DROIT CIVIL no 24 (1958): "Article 1590 [La. Civil Code Art. 2463] is
simply interpretative of the presumed intent of the parties. It may result from the
terms that it [the deposit] is given as proof of the sale or on account of the purchase price, in which case neither party has the privilege of withdrawal." Accord:
2 PLANIOL, op. Cit. supra note 2, at no. 1390.
33. See Breaux v. Burkenstock, 165 La. 266, 115 So. 482 (1928); and cases
cited supra note 32. See also Hebert, The Function of Earnest Money in the Civil
Law of Sales, 11 LOYOLA L. J. 121 (1930).
34. See Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930); Haeuser v.
Schiro, 235 La. 909, 106 So.2d 306, 316 (1958).
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On the other hand, there is no reason why, if a seller gave a
buyer an option to buy certain property at a given price, he could
not exact a deposit from the buyer with the understanding that
if the buyer decided not to exercise or take up the option he would
simply forfeit the deposit, and that if the seller elected not to sell
he would return the double. The agreement is here framed so as
to demonstrate that the buyer is simply putting up forfeit money,
not buying an option, the difference being that when he puts up
earnest money he is making it possible for the seller to withdraw
as well as himself, but when he buys an option he acquires an
irrevocable power to buy the property, and the seller becomes
irrevocably bound to sell it to him if he elects to take up the
option. This sort of an agreement would be unusual here in Louisiana, but it constitutes a definite legal possibility as it does in
France.
Although the French may be concerned with whether or not
a deposit of earnest money will operate to suspend the transfer
of ownership, this question, it appears, could not arise in Louisiana, insofar as immovables are concerned, because of the rule
that ownership does not pass on the basis of a bilateral agreement to sell and to buy where the parties contemplate the execution and delivery of an act of sale at a later date. Consequently
when a deposit is put up in Louisiana in connection with a contract looking toward the transfer of an immovable at a later date,
title does not pass. This is simply the result of the stated rule,
and not because it is found that the parties by putting up earnest money have manifested an intention to suspend the transfer
of ownership. Actually we seem to put the cart before the horse.
In France a finding that a deposit is earnest money results in a
suspension of the transfer of ownership. Here a finding that
ownership does not pass by the agreement results in a finding
that a deposit is earnest money. The result is the same with us,
therefore, as with the French, but the reasoning is wholly dissimilar.
The question could arise, however, in a transaction involving
a movable because we follow Article 2456 in such cases and consider the sale as perfected between the parties when there is an
agreement for the object and the price thereof although the thing
has not yet been delivered and the price has not been paid.35 If
35. State v. Shields, 110 La. 547, 34 So. 673 (1903) ; Geo. D. Witt Shoe Co. v.
J. A. Seegars & Co., 122 La. 145, 47 So. 444 (1908). But see American Creosote
Works v. Boland Machine & Mfg. Co., 213 La. 834, 35 So.2d 749 (1948).
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we should follow the French view, that a deposit of forfeit money
operates to suspend the transfer of ownership until the parties
forego the power of withdrawing and perform instead, it would
not be necessary for us to concern ourselves with whether the
deposit is put up in connection with a contract to sell or a sale,
since in any case where it is put up the transaction could not
amount to a sale, but would be a simple contract to sell. For
example, let's assume that A selects a particular car at a used car
lot, makes a deposit of $100.00 on the price, and agrees to return
Saturday with the remainder and take the car. If the deposit is
earnest money, and the view is followed that such a deposit operates to suspend the transfer of ownership, the sale would be suspended notwithstanding the concurrence of thing, price, and consent. In determining whether the deposit should be counted as
earnest money it would not be proper to apply the rule stated in
cases involving immovables, i.e., that any money put up in connection with a contract to sell is earnest money. The application
of this rule would require an inquiry into whether the agreement
concerning the car amounted to a sale or a contract to sell. 86 As
stated above, such a question where movables are involved is
usually resolved by an application of the principle stated in Article 2456. If the parties are dealing with a specific thing, and
the agreement calls for no performance by the seller other than
delivery, and a price is agreed upon, then the sale is considered
to be perfect and the property is acquired of right by the buyer
with respect to the seller. In the example given the thing is specific and the price is agreed upon, consequently ownership would
pass under the article. This being true, an application of the rule
as stated in cases involving immovables would require the holding that the deposit was not earnest money because it was put up
in connection with a sale instead of a contract to sell. Yet the
situation is one where earnest money could well be deposited if
the parties so desired, and where they might well be presumed
to have so intended in the absence of a contrary manifestation
of intention. The forfeiture of earnest money put up under a
bilateral contract is a substitute for performance. It is only when
the election has been made between performance and forfeiture
that earnest money passes out of the picture. Therefore, until
performance has been rendered each party may elect instead to
forfeit the amount deposited as earnest. In the used car case,
even if it be said that ownership passes because the parties have
36. Searcy v. Gulf Motor Co., 37 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1948).
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agreed on a specific thing for a fixed price the buyer has not yet
paid the price nor has the seller delivered the car. These are the
performances in question and, treating the deposit as forfeit
money, either party might elect forfeiture in lieu of rendering
them. Consequently, if any deposit made in connection with an
agreement for the sale of a movable is to be presumed earnest
money, instead of applying this presumption to a contract to sell,
as in cases involving immovables, it ought to be applied, if at all,
to an executory contract, meaning one where the basic obligations of delivery and payment remain unperformed, and this
without reference to whether or not, as a purely legal proposition,
ownership may be in one party or the other. But a sounder view,
more in accord with the probable intentions of the parties and
less calculated to be productive of difficulties, is that a deposit
of earnest money, as with the French, operates as a suspensive
condition to the perfection of the sale. A determination that the
parties meant the deposit to be earnest money would then depend
solely on an absence of a contrary manifestation of intention.
The writer has never been sympathetic to the rule that, in the
absence of a stipulation to the contrary, any money deposited in
connection with a contract to sell is earnest money. There is no
discernible public policy supporting such a broad presumption.
The parties should have full control over their agreement in this
respect, and if they state that the payment is made as part of the
purchase price or to bind the sale, this should preclude the conclusion that it was made as a forfeit to preserve the power of
withdrawal. In other words, a deposit should be counted as earnest money only where there is no contrary manifestation by the
parties.37 The basic objection to the broad presumption is that
its application too often does violence to the manifest intention
of the parties. If it is applied to facilitate the disposition of cases
of this kind, it ought to yield to a contrary showing of intention
which would be consistent with the way the French handle such
problems. Of course, the broad presumption, which requires language specifically negativing the intention to deposit earnest
money, may afford some certainty to lawyers who may be called
37. It is no answer to say, as did Chief Justice O'Niell in Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761, 765 (1917), that, "The giving of earnest money
is always intended to be a part of the purchase price if the sale be consummated;
and it is, or ought to be, always intended that the sale be consummated." Of
course, if the money is not forfeited by the buyer because he does not elect to
withdraw, it would doubtless be applied to the purchase price. But this does not
overcome the fact that if the parties say that the deposit is part payment of the
purchase price they are thereby indicating that it is not being put up as a forfeit
to secure a privilege of withdrawal.
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in to determine the legal effect of a contract entered into without
their aid, or to the courts in disposing of such problems, but it
perhaps came as a shock to Breaux, and others, who had put up
a portion of the purchase price "to bind the sale" to discover that
they were actually unbinding it by putting up the money. 38
This is exactly what happened again in a recent case3 9 where
an option granted in a lease required the lessee, upon exercising
the option, to pay ten percent of the purchase price. In due
course he elected to take the property and, as required, paid the
ten percent. In consequence his subsequent attempt to secure a
judgment ordering a conveyance of the property failed. Under
the rule as it is framed he was doomed to failure.
In the first place there was simply an option, or promise of
sale, which created in the lessee a legal power to convert the
option into a bilateral contract to sell the property to him at his
election. An effective exercise of the power required in addition
to the lessee's acceptance in writing, the payment of the ten percent. The lessee acted accordingly, and when he did, the option
or promise of sale then amounted to a sale in the sense that,
according to our Code, the offeree was entitled to specific performance, which is another way of saying that the option was
converted into a contract to sell, which normally would be specifically enforceable. But then the making of part payment of the
purchase price led to the application of the rule that any money
put up in connection with a contract to sell is presumed to be
earnest money in the absence of a contrary stipulation. Consequently, since the contract resulting from the exercise of the
option was a contract to sell rather than a sale, the deposit was
held to constitute earnest money.
The reason that a decision of this kind may be disturbing is
that it seems to be clearly contrary not only to what was contemplated by the lessee but to the requirements of justice. The lessee
had given value for his option by taking the lease, and then, when
he sought to avail himself of the benefit for which he had paid
by making part payment of the purchase price, he discovered
that his recourse was limited to a return of double the deposit
he was required to make to establish his right granted by the
option. He had bought not the right to acquire the property, but
38. Breaux v. Burkenstock, 165 La. 266, 115 So. 482 (1928) ; Capo v. Bugdahl,
117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906) ; Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907)
Legier v. Braughan, 123 La. 463, 49 So. 22 (1909).
39. Haeuser v. Schiro, 235 La. 909, 106 So.2d 306 (1958).
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merely the right to recover ten percent of the purchase price,
and in order to establish his right to this he would have to first
put up ten percent of the purchase price. Some sting may be removed from a situation of this kind by the recovery of double
the deposit, and the writer suspects that this fact has had much
to do with the tenacity of the presumption, but the recovery may
not actually assuage the wrong the option holder may feel has
been done to him by the legal rule which stands in the way of his
getting the property itself.
There may be some difference between this situation and one
where there is no preceding option but, instead, a bilateral contract to sell accompanied by the payment by the purchaser of a
portion of the purchase price, but this is by no means clear. Possibly, the latter case may lend itself more realistically to the impact of the presumption, but that is all. There is merit, of course,
in adhering to a rule of the kind under consideration, but the degree thereof remains a subject of proper inquiry. This has not
always been the rule. 40 And if it was changed once it can be
changed again. It is believed that the way out of the difficulty
posed by the case discussed lies not in trying to distinguish between a promise of sale and an option which are, it seems clear,
actually the same, but in restricting the presumption that a payment accompanying a contract to sell will be earnest money to
the case where it does not appear that it was made to bind the
sale or as part payment of the purchase price; or more broadly
41
It
where there is no indication why the payment was made.
does not seem an adequate answer to say that the right to specific enforcement can always be reserved. Where the parties contract with benefit of counsel this may be realistic and sound, but
otherwise it cannot be, because it is not calculated to produce a
result consistent with the intentions of the parties, and there is
no real justification for saying that their intentions should not be
given effect.
The rule that an agreement for the sale of an immovable,
where the parties contemplate a formal act of sale at a later date,
is to be treated as a contract to sell or convey the property at the
date agreed upon is perhaps a sound one despite the contrary
French view. Some common law jurisdictions have come around
to it as a matter of case law and a uniform act to this effect has
40. Provenzano v. Glaesser, 122 La. 78, 47 So. 688 (1908),

and authorities

there cited.

41. See the dissenting opinion of Tate, J., in Haeuser v. Schiro, 235 La. 909,
106 So.2d 306 (1958).
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been proposed.4 From a practical point of view it seems to work
better. It§ application does not offend what the parties actually
intend. The chances are that most laymen would not count themselves as owners of an immovable until the accomplishment of
an act of sale.
It might well be, also, that a similar view with respect to sales
of chattels would be better, and that ownership and risk of loss
should not pass to the buyer until delivery or tender thereof.
Under the rule res petit domino ownership bears on risk, but it
also bears on the right of third parties who deal with the seller
in possession and the remedies available to the buyer in the event
of a breach by the seller.
As far as risk is concerned it would accord better with the
practicalities of the case to keep it on the seller remaining in possession until delivery. The use of insurance is so widespread
these days that if the risk remains on the seller the loss will ultimately be borne in all likelihood by one who has been paid to
assume it. 43 Surely it is more likely that the seller in possession
will have insurance to cover his interest in the property than will
the buyer, and it is not too likely that his policy will cover the
latter's interest. If the seller's interest is a whole interest because the entire risk is in him, he will be fully protected and the
buyer will not have to suffer any loss. The cost of the insurance
to him can in turn be reflected in the price to the buyer.
Whether or not title passes to the buyer by the agreement,
the court could declare him owner and direct the seller to surrender possession of the thing.4 4 The obligation to deliver a
specific existing thing is an obligation to give as opposed to an
obligation to do. But, even if the buyer may not be the owner
and entitled to possession as such, the law could recognize his
right to a specific enforcement of the seller's duty to deliver
where the thing is specific and no further action beyond surrender of possession is required of him. That is, such a right does
not have to be made to rest on ownership. And the same could be
said of a recovery of the price by the seller. The civil fruits of
the movable could follow the ownership, as presently provided, 4
or the law could provide that they would belong to the buyer
42. See UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT (1935).

43. Of. American Creosote Works v. Boland Machine & Mfg. Co., 213 La. 834,
35 So.2d 749 (1948).
44. 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET DE LA MORANDIERE, Op. Cit. supra note 8, at no 155.

45. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 498, 545, 2489 (1870).

1960]

AN ANALYTICAL

DISCUSSION

from the time the contract was formed subject to any contrary
agreement. Finally, the rights of third parties, including creditors, are adequately protected under the present system46 and if
ownership should remain in the seller until delivery, adequate
protection to the buyer could be provided.
It is interesting to notice that the proposed Uniform Commercial Code has taken account of the practicalities of the problem
from a commercial point of view by abandoning the principle res
petit domino. Risk has been separated from title and, in general,
in transactions between merchants, remains on the seller where
there has been no breach as long as the seller remains in possession of the goods. By way of explanation, the comment of the
draftsmen states, "The underlying theory of this rule is that a
merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to insure his interest in them. '47 It is further recognized as "extremely unlikely" that the buyer will carry insurance on goods not in
his possession. Where, for example, the goods are at the time of
contracting already identified, and no documents are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting, but at
the same time, if this is a transaction between merchants, risk
will not pass to the buyer until his receipt of the goods. In general, likewise the buyer's right to specific performance is dealt
with independently of title48 although he may maintain replevin
on the basis of ownership if it appears that he cannot readily
effect cover and the goods have been identified to the contract.
The comments of the draftsmen make it clear that the concept
of "title," which involves also the problem of "sale," is dealt with
not because of the legal relationships and their consequences as
between buyer and seller, but because of the possible impact of
any public regulation considered by the courts as incorporating
49
the "private" law.
Of course, the Louisiana Civil Code identifies risk with title
and the case law is consistent. In the case of immovables the
jurisprudence, in apparent disagreement with the Code, keeps
the risk on the seller until delivery, through the delivery of an
act of sale to the buyer. As far as movables are concerned the
jurisprudence is with the Code - ownership passes upon the per46. Id. arts. 1922, 1923.
47. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-509 and comments

48. Id. § 2-716.
49. Id. § 2-401 and comment 1.

(Official Text 1957).
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fection of the contract where the parties are dealing with identified goods and only a surrender of possession remains, and the
risk likewise shifts under the principle res petit domino. Of
course, it is not being here suggested that, because the jurisprudence has adopted the view that delivery of an act of sale is required to pass title to an immovable, it should be held likewise
that delivery of a movable is required to pass ownership. The
comments here made are designed to point out that consideration
might well be given to the adoption of such a principle when the
possibility of a change is under study.
The rule, apparently recognized in the jurisprudence, that
the price paid for an option is not earnest money, seems to constitute an accurate reflection of the understanding of the parties.
The same cannot be said of the rule which converts a payment of
a part of the purchase price, or a payment to bind the sale, into
a payment of earnest money in the absence of a stipulation to
the contrary.
By virtue of the last amendment to Article 2462 of the Civil
Code, the giver of an option cannot bind himself by his will alone
as he can in France. A binding option requires "consideration."
This well may be sound policy. When a person gives an option to
another he seriously limits his legal freedom and affords the
promisee a speculative advantage during the period allowed for
its exercise. An increase in the value of the property will benefit
only the latter in the event he chooses to take up the option. If
he has not in some fashion paid for it, he has all to gain and
nothing to lose, since by simply allowing the option to expire he
avoids the consequences of a decrease in value. Under our law
the option holder possesses a valuable property right and, from
a business point of view, it is by no means manifest that such an
acquisition should be made without cost. The fact that both
Pothier and Planiol in giving examples of a promise of sale attach
it respectively to a sale of other things, and to a lease, may be
indicative of similar thinking or, at least, a use in practice consonant with this feeling. In each of these illustrations the promisor does receive something in return. However much importance
the redactors of the French Civil Code may have attached to the
juristic efficacy of the will, there may be some justifiable limits
to the application of this theory in business transactions. The
law as an instrument of equity may find it necessary sometimes
to indulge lack of foresight and discourage overreaching. Assum-
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ing, therefore, that the amendment in question was designed to
depart from the system of the French Code, this may have been
a wise course.
At the same time, there is much to be said in favor of a system under which an offeror may not be deemed privileged to
revoke his offer without allowing a reasonable time for its acceptance where the circumstances are such that the offeree is
justified in believing that the offeror so intends. Such a rule
simply protects the offeree's reasonable expectations which is the
prime purpose of the law of contract. The Uniform Commercial
Code is positive evidence that the modern tendency is in this direction. It recognizes that irrevocable firm offers may be made
by a merchant without the necessity of consideration. 0 A maximum period of three months is allowed. The comment makes it
clear that the principle is not designed to apply to long term
options. Thus is the line drawn between options and irrevocable
simple offers. The approach is a sensible and practical one. The
period chosen has the authority of the Uniform Commissioners
and the American Law Institute behind it. Presumably the choice
was a sound one. It seems clearly adequate to reach most cases
where time for acceptance is required to satisfy the commercial
necessities of the transaction in question. It guards against improvidence on the part of the offeror as well as his possible entrapment by the offeree. Indeed, a further precaution against
the latter exists in the requirement that, where the offeror uses a
form supplied by the offeree, he initial the provision in question.
If Article 1809 of the Louisiana Civil Code no longer applies to
offers to sell, we have surrendered a basic principle of the civil
law that is now finding acceptance by our sister system. Is this
the way we want it?
50. Id. § 2-205.

